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regarding the true legislative aims of American antitrust law. This Note argues that interpreters
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antitrust statutes enacted contemporaneously with the Sherman Act-to better understand the
roots of federal antitrust law. The Sherman Act's legislative history indicates that Congress
intended to prohibit the same combinations in restraint of trade that were already prohibited by
state statutory and common law. The plain language of the Sherman Act's state predecessors
shows that most were designed to promote what we now call consumer welfare. These statutes
prohibited only those business combinations that harmed consumers by artificially constraining
the supply of consumer goods. Read in this context, the Sherman Act is properly understood as
the federal component of a national program on behalf of consumer welfare.
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INTRODUCTION
In an age of ever more complex congressional enactments, the Sherman Act
stands out as an unusual piece of legislation. The 125-year-old core of American
antitrust law remains powerful and ubiquitous: between 2012 and 2014, it gave
rise to prosecutions generating $3.4 billion in criminal fines across a range of
industries. Yet it was drafted with semantic economy, rendering its meaning
elusive. In just ninety-six words, section i of the Act prohibits all agreements
"in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States."' Section 2 of the
Act, in eighty-two words, imposes criminal penalties on "[e]very person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States."' The law's Delphic language, together
with Congress's infrequent modification of the federal antitrust regime, has led
some to conclude that "[t]he Sherman Act set up a common law system in
antitrust."
Notwithstanding occasional invocations of the judiciary's "common law"
authority over the Sherman Act, federal courts have, since the Act's earliest
days, expended great energy attempting to divine the legislative purpose
behind it.' If the Sherman Act were truly a blanket grant of common law-
making authority to federal courts, they would hardly need to undertake such
searching inquiries. The Supreme Court's and lower courts' close attention to
the Sherman Act's language and legislative history indicates that they have
sought to abide by their constitutional role as interpreters of federal statutes.'
1. See Antitrust Div., Criminal Enforcement Fine and jail Charts Through Fiscal Year 2014, U.S.
DEP'T JUST. (June 25, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/atr/criminal-enforcement-fine-and-jail
-charts [http://perma.cc/HFAS-J9TT]; Antitrust Div., Sherman Act Violations Yielding a
Corporate Fine of $10 Million or More, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.justice
.gov/sites/default/files/atrAegacy/2o5/o4/23/shermanio.pdf [http://perma.cc/VB5P- 5 9 AY].
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
3. Id. § 2.
4. Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1696, 1705 (1986); cf
Andrew S. Oldham, Sherman's March (in)to the Sea, 74 TENN. L. REv. 319, 325 (2007)
(arguing that common-law judicial interpretation has "unmoored the Sherman Act from its
statutory foundations and set it adrift in a stormy sea of illegitimacy").
5. See infra notes 7-17 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 328 n.7 (1991); Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 531 (1983); Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, So (1911); Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll., 128 F.3 d
59, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1997); McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1497-98 (1ith Cir.
1988); GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Cont'l T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1019 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1976), affd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977); cf Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 644 (1981)
("It is very true that we use common-law terms here and common-law definitions in order
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It is therefore more precise to say that the judiciary enjoys an especially
wide authority to fill statutory gaps when interpreting the Sherman Act due to
the Act's ambiguous language, its constancy over time, and the fact-peculiar
in light of many modern regulatory regimes-that Congress did not assign
rulemaking authority to an administrative agency. These traits do not imply
that federal courts may pursue whatever antitrust policy they find most
desirable or wise; courts are obliged to follow the statute's contours to the
extent that they can perceive those contours.
The judiciary's evolving understanding of the Sherman Act has
dramatically affected the scope of antitrust law in the United States. The
Supreme Court first purported to strictly construe the Act's prohibition of
"every contract ... in restraint of trade," noting that "no exception or limitation
can be added without placing in the act that which has been omitted by
Congress." 8 The Court later set aside the statute's plain meaning' and seized
upon the statute's use of common-law language to derive a common-law "rule
of reason" prohibiting only those agreements that "unreasonably" restrained
trade.o
In the middle of the twentieth century, the dominant reading shifted. In
the legislative history of the Sherman Act courts found a congressional intent
to preserve competition for the benefit of other producers. In his famous Alcoa
opinion, Judge Hand wrote that "Congress ... was not necessarily actuated by
economic motives alone. It is possible, because of its indirect social or moral
effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his success
upon his own skill and character."" He cited the Congressional Record for the
proposition that the Sherman Act was designed "to put an end to great
aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of the individual before
to define an offense which is in itself comparatively new, but it is not a common-law
jurisdiction that we are conferring upon the circuit courts of the United States." (quoting 21 CONG.
REc. 3149 (1890) (statement of Sen. Morgan))).
7. See U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States . . . ."); id. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish.").
8. United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 328 (1897) (emphasis added).
9. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("[T]he legality of an
agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains
competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To
bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.").
1o. See, e.g., Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 51 ("It is certain that [the Act's] terms, at least in their
rudimentary meaning, took their origin in the common law."); United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 278-79 (6th Cir. 1898), a4f'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
ii. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cit. 1945).
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them."'" In cases like United States v. Von's Grocery Co., the Supreme Court
invoked Congress's general fear of "concentration," and adopted the view that
the purpose of the Sherman Act was "to prevent economic concentration in the
American economy by keeping a large number of small competitors in
business.""
Change came yet again in 1966. Robert Bork, then an antitrust professor
at Yale, delved into the Senate debates over the Sherman Act and
concluded that Congress's legislative intent in enacting the Sherman Act was
to "maximiz[e] . . . consumer welfare," without regard to the interests of
competitors.' Within a decade, lower federal courts began signing on to this
proposition.s In 1979 the Supreme Court unanimously concluded, "Congress
designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription.'",6 The Court
has since repeatedly affirmed that interpretation. 17
Putting aside the modern judicial consensus, the statutory underpinnings
of the consumer-welfare theory remain shaky. The text of the Sherman Act, of
course, says nothing about "consumer welfare,"' 8 and there is a general sense
within the legal academy that Bork reached his conclusions by cherry-picking
from a complex and contradictory legislative history.' 9 Subsequent studies of
the Sherman Act's legislative history revealed other policies, including
12. Id. at 428 & n.1 (citing 21 CONG. REC. 2457, 246o (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman)).
13. 384 U.S. 270, 274-75 (1966).
14. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 48
(1966).
15. See, e.g., GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Cont'1 T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1003 & n-39 (9 th Cir. 1976),
af'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
16. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 66 (1978)).
17. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013); Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 906 (2007); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221 (1993); Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd.
of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984).
is. The definition of "consumer welfare" is itself the subject of considerable debate. This Note
follows the most common understanding of the phrase, as a byword for allocative efficiency.
See infra Part II.
ig. See, e.g., Christopher Grandy, Original Intent and the Sherman Antitrust Act: A Re-
Examination of the Consumer-Welfare Hypothesis, 53 J. EcoN. HIST. 359 (1993); Thomas W.
Hazlett, The Legislative History of the Sherman Act Re-Examined, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 263
(1992); Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall ofEfficiency as the Ruler ofAntitrust, 33
ANTITRUST BULL. 429, 451 n.81 (1988) ("Bork selectively interprets Congressional will to
suit his own agenda; he does not defer to a Congress that had different goals."). But see
Daniel A. Crane, The Tempting of Antitrust: Robert Bork and the Goals of Antitrust Policy, 79
ANTITRUST L.J. 835, 840-44 (2014).
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producer welfare,' protection of consumers and small suppliers,' and
prevention of an accumulation of "excessive social and political power" in the
hands of monopolists.' Barak Orbach summarizes a widespread view: "The
legislative history of the Sherman Act has been studied thoroughly during the
past century. There is broad agreement today, if not consensus, that the record
does not support the historical claims that led to the adoption of the consumer
welfare standard."' Reflecting on the scholarly debate, one introductory
antitrust casebook advises students, "[Y]ou . . may be tempted to try to
ascertain the congressional intent underlying [the Sherman Act]. No matter
how much you research the history of the Act . . . you are unlikely to find
convincing answers."
This Note proposes that convincing answers can be found outside the
immediate legislative history of the Sherman Act, in a body of pre-Sherman
Act state law. In particular, thirteen state antitrust statutes and five state
constitutional antitrust provisions -adopted while Congress debated the
Sherman Act between 1888 and 1890 - shed light on the policy underlying the
Sherman Act.
Consulting state legislation may seem like an odd way to derive the
meaning of a federal statute as foundational as the Sherman Act. But, as Part I
argues, it follows an old canon of statutory interpretation, in pari materia,
which advises courts to read related statutes in harmony where the statutes are
part of an "integrated scheme" of regulation.2 ' Though the legislative history of
the Sherman Act contains few sure answers, there is wide agreement that
Congress intended the Act to work in concert with state antitrust law,
providing a federal forum for targeting the anticompetitive combinations that
,6
were already illegal in the states.
Part II explores the text of the state statutes and constitutional amendments
and finds a clear pattern among them. Far more detailed than the Sherman Act,
these statutes and constitutional amendments articulated the states' original
20. See Grandy, supra note 19, at 359.
21. See John B. Kirkwood, The Essence ofAntitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from
Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 2425, 2433-39 (2013).
22. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 83 (1982).
23. Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 2253, 2256 (2013).
24. THOMAS D. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS ORIGINS
24-25 (4th ed. 2009).
25. CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 487 (2011).
26. See, e.g., California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 1o2 (1989) ("Congress intended the
federal antitrust laws to supplement, not displace, state antitrust remedies."); Herbert
Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L.J. 375, 375 (1983).
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consumer-welfare policy. This policy had three major features. First, it
emphasized the principle of allocative efficiency. In other words, most state
statutes prohibited only arrangements that had the effect of raising prices for
consumers by restricting productive output. Second, this policy protected
consumers not by reference to overall social output, but by reference to
industrial output in discrete product markets. Third, it incorporated a mens rea
requirement, making antitrust liability contingent on an actual intent to harm
consumers through restrictions on output.
Part III brings the original consumer-welfare policy into the present day,
briefly explaining how the approach embodied in the early state antitrust
statutes would address some of the unresolved questions in modern antitrust
law. It first explores how the original consumer-welfare policy differs from
competing standards advanced by scholars, such as "total welfare" and
"competition" standards. It then explains why the original consumer-welfare
policy is consistent with the Supreme Court's present consumer-welfare
approach, which has generally moved antitrust law away from per se liability
standards and toward individualized assessments of consumer harm. The
federal courts' current focus on consumer welfare should be understood not as
a modern contrivance, but as a faithful application of the Sherman Act as it was
written.
I. STATE ANTITRUST LEGISLATION AND THE SHERMAN ACT, IN
PARI MATERIA
A long-established principle of statutory construction holds that "if
divers[e] statutes relate to the same thing, they ought all to be taken into
consideration in construing any one of them, and it is an established rule of
law, that all acts in par materia are to be taken together, as if they were one
law."' Although "the rule's application certainly makes the most sense when
the statutes were enacted by the same legislative body at the same time,"` the
Supreme Court and other federal and state courts have treated related federal
27. United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 564 (1845); see United States v. Stewart, 311
U.S. 6o, 64-65 (1940); WILUAM N. ESKRJDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION 1o66-81 (4 th ed. 2007); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. REV. 621, 663 n.169 (1990); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside-an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the
Canons: Part 1, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 927 fig.' (2013); Quintin Johnstone, An Evaluation of
the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 3 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1954) ("All courts make great use
of statutes in pari materia .... ).
28. Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 244 (1972).
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and state statutes in pari materia where it is clear that one statute is intended to
work in concert with the provisions of another.29
Statutes that work in pari materia might not say so on their face, and
courts - including those favoring textualist interpretive approaches - make use
of legislative history to determine whether one statute is intended to
incorporate the provisions of another.3o As Caleb Nelson explains,
At a minimum, when courts conclude that two statutes are part of
an integrated scheme, courts will resist reading those statutes to
work at cross-purposes. More broadly, courts often try to resolve
indeterminacies in one statute in a way that keeps the statute in tune
with the policies behind other statutes that are in pari materia."
In accord with the in pari materia canon, federal and state courts have
frequently treated judicial constructions of the Sherman Act as binding or
persuasive authority in construing analogous state statutes passed after the
Sherman Act's adoption in order to avoid conflicts between state and federal
antitrust policies."
29. See, e.g., Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 214 (934) (reading the Federal
Safety Appliance Act in pari materia with an analogous Kentucky statute); Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Am. Bank Tr. Shares, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 549, 559-60 (D.S.C. 1978); Underwater
Constr. v. Shirley, 884 P.2d 150, 155 (Alaska 1994); Wilson v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 435
A.2d 353, 359 (Conn. 1980); Bethlehem Steel v. Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 662 A.2d 256,
258 (Md. 1995); Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyo. Dep't ofEnvtl. Quality, 2010 WY
25, ¶ 7, 226 P. 3d 809, 813 (Wyo. 2010).
30. See FAIC Sec. Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing statements
entered in the Congressional Record to determine that the National Housing Act should be
read in pari materia with the Federal Deposit Insurance Act).
31. NELSON, supra note 25, at 487.
32. See, e.g., Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 1014 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting
that the plaintiffs' Pennsylvania-law antitrust claim "rises or falls with plaintiffs' federal
antitrust claims"); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 269 F. Supp. 2d
1213, 1223-24 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (finding that construction of federal antitrust law should
guide construction of state antitrust law because the state law "has objectives identical to the
federal antitrust acts" (quoting Vinci v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 36 Cal. App. 4 th 1811, 1814 n.
(Ct. App. 1995))); Stolow v. Greg Manning Auctions Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 236, 244 n.8
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Verizon N.J., Inc. v. Ntegrity Telecontent Servs., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 2d
616, 632 (D.N.J. 2002); La. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 493 So. 2d 1149,
1158 (La. 1986) ("Because La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:122 is a counterpart to § 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sherman Act should
be a persuasive influence on the interpretation of our own state enactment."); Beville v.
Curry, 2001OK 1, 1 11, 39 P-3d 754, 759; H.J. Baker & Bros., Inc. v. Orgonics, Inc., 554 A.2d
196, 204 (R.I. 1989); Hovenkamp, supra note 26, at 377 n.1o ("[S]tate antitrust laws are
substantively similar to federal antitrust law, and many state courts have held that case law
interpreting the federal statutes is fully applicable to corresponding state statutes.").
1079
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The same principle of statutory interpretation should extend to America's
first codified antitrust laws: the antitrust statutes and constitutional provisions
passed by state legislators while Congress debated the Sherman Act. These
statutes were part of a legislative conversation between Congress and the
states, and the Sherman Act's legislative history shows that Congress intended
the federal and state antitrust laws to work together as part of a cohesive
national regulatory scheme. Courts and scholars should therefore examine the
Sherman Act's legislative purpose in light of these state-law antecedents.
Admittedly, reading a federal statute -particularly one as foundational as
the Sherman Act-in light of state law might strike some as unconventional. It
should not. Federal courts regularly read federal statutes in light of preexisting
state common-law decisions when Congress incorporates terms from the
common law in its statutes." For many years, courts" and commentatorss
have understood the Sherman Act's operative terms as common-law terms that
should be interpreted in light of preexisting state case law, such as the
Michigan Supreme Court's decision in Richardson v. Buhl,,6 of which Senator
John Sherman took particular notice on the floor of the Senate. Federal courts
read these state common-law precedents into the Sherman Act on the
understanding that Congress intended to prohibit interstate trusts to the same
extent as they had been prohibited at the intrastate level by state law. But
33. See, e.g., Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 72. n.o, 73-74, 73 nn.11-12 (1995) (consulting state-
court definitions to determine the level of reliance required to constitute "actual fraud"
under a provision of the federal Bankruptcy Code); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255,
269 (1992) (consulting state-court definitions of "extortion" to clarify the meaning of
"extortion" in the Hobbs Act).
34. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 531 (1983); Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 & n.11
(1978).
3s. See, e.g., Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 81 FoPRDHAM L.
REv. 2279, 2340 (2013) (noting that "backers of the Sherman Act assured the floor of the
Senate that they were merely seeking to enable federal courts to apply the common law to
anticompetitive business activities and early federal cases are full of citations to English and
state common law"); William L. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-189o,
23 U. CHI. L. REv. 221, 252-53 (1956) (noting Senator Sherman's argument that the Sherman
Act was meant to prohibit "all those [combinations] which the common law had always
condemned as unlawful" and recalling Sherman's reading of the Richardson v. Buhl decision
on the floor of the Senate).
36. 43 N.W. 1102 (Mich. 1889); see also N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 341 (1904)
(citing Richardson, among other state-court decisions); United States v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 291 (6th Cit. 1898) (same), afd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
37. 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
38. See, e.g., N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 339 ("[W]hen Congress declared contracts, combinations
and conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce to be illegal, it did nothing more than
1o8o
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those same courts have long relied solely on state judicial opinions to
understand the state-law landscape at the time of the Sherman Act's
adoption." This focus on state judicial opinions has neglected the content of
local legislation- state constitutional and statutory law-that took shape as
Congress debated the Sherman Act. Congress intended for the Act to work in
harmony with that legislation, just as it intended for federal antitrust law to
follow the contours of common-law prohibitions on conspiracies in restraint of
trade.40 Taking notice of state statutes in part materia provides another way of
understanding the antitrust prohibitions that Congress sought to enforce at the
interstate level when it passed the Act.
A. The Legislative Conversation Between the Senate and the States
Seventeen states drafted measures contemporaneously with the Sherman
Act in a wave of public backlash against monopolistic trusts' growing control of
various industries in the 188os.4 ' These trusts included famous aggregations
like the Standard Oil petroleum refining monopoly and the mighty Sugar
Trust, but also a host of trusts cornering more obscure markets such as the
School Slate Trust, the Envelope Trust, and the Paper Bag Trust.' As William
Letwin recognized in his canonical study of the Sherman Act's legislative
history, news articles and editorials attacking the trusts were the daily fare of
major newspapers like The New York Times and The Chicago Tribune in the late
188os.43 Opponents of the trusts, one commentator colorfully explained, saw
the new class of monopolists as "merciless and cruel exploiters, completely
selfish, living by no rules and guided by no ethics."' Letwin summed up more
apply to interstate commerce a rule that had been long applied by the several States when
dealing with combinations that were in restraint of their domestic commerce.").
39. See, e.g., id. at 339-41.
40. See infra notes 113, 116, 120-125 and accompanying text.
41. See IDAHO CONST. art. XI, § 18 (1889); MONT. CONST. art. XV, § 20 (1889); N.D. CONsT.
art. VII, § 146 (1889); WASH. CONST. art. XII, 5 22 (1889); WYo. CONST. art. X, § 8 (1889);
Act of Apr. 16, 1888, ch. 84, 1888 Iowa Acts 124; Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 257, 1889 Kan. Sess.
Laws 389; Act of May 20, 1890, ch. 1621, 1889 Ky. Acts 143; Act of Mar. 7, 1889, ch. 266,
1889 Me. Laws 235; Act of July 1, 1889, No. 225, 1889 Mich. Pub. Acts 331; Act of Feb. 22,
1890, ch. 36, 1890 Miss. Laws 55; Act of May 18, 1889, 1889 Mo. Laws 96; Act of Mar. 29,
1889, ch. 69, 1889 Neb. Laws S16; Act of Mar. n1, 1889, ch. 374, 1889 N.C. Sess. Laws 372;
Act of Mar. 3, 1890, ch. 174, 1890 N.D. Laws 503; Act of Mar. 7, 1890, ch. 154, 1890 S.D.
Sess. Laws 323; Act of Apr. 4, 188 9, ch. 250, 1889 Tenn. Pub. Acts 475; Act of Mar. 30, 1889,
ch. 117, 1889 Tex. Gen. Laws 141.
42. See Letwin, supra note 35, at 234; see also Collins, supra note 35, at 2315-28.
43. Letwin, supra note 35, at 224.
44. Will Wilson, The State Antitrust Laws, 47 A.B.A. J. 16o, 16o (1961).
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modestly, "In the years immediately before the Sherman Act, between 1888 and
1890, there were few who doubted that the public hated the trusts fervently."4 s
Elected state and federal officials channeled this popular anger into
legislative action.46 Iowa was first out of the gate. In April 1888, its legislature
adopted an "Act for the Punishment of Pools, Trusts and Conspiracies." At
their national conventions that summer, for the first time, both the Democratic
and Republican platforms included antitrust policy planks.8 The Republicans
declared their
opposition to all combinations of capital, organized in trusts or
otherwise, to control arbitrarily the condition of trade among our
citizens; and . . . recommend[ed] to Congress and the state legislatures,
in their respective jurisdictions, such legislation as will prevent the
execution of all schemes to oppress the people by undue charges on
their supplies, or by unjust rates for the transportation of their products
to market.49
That year, the Republican Convention nominated for president a
compromise candidate, Benjamin Harrison, over the early front-runner,
Senator Sherman of Ohio."o One month after his defeat, Sherman successfully
asked the Senate to give the Senate Finance Committee, of which Sherman was
the former chairman and a leading member,s" jurisdiction over all bills dealing
with the regulation of the "arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or
combinations ... which tend to prevent free and full competition."s2
Efforts to craft a federal antitrust law began in earnest, and two early bills
set the initial framework of the debate. Senator John Reagan, a Democrat from
45. Letwin, supra note 35, at 222.
46. See David Millon, The First Antitrust Statute, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 141, 148 (1990) ("Most
antitrust activity began not at the national level, but rather at the state and local level."
(quoting STEVEN L. PloTT, THE ANTI-MONOPOLY PERSUASION: POPULAR RESISTANCE TO THE
RISE OF BIG BUSINESS IN THE MIDWEST 4 (1985))).
47. Act of Apr. 16, 1888, ch. 84, 1888 Iowa Acts 124.
48. See HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORGINATION OF AN AMERICAN
TRADITION 150-51 (1955).
49. Id. at 151 (quoting THOMAS H. MCKEE, THE NATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND PLATFORMS OF
ALL POLITICAL PARTIES, 1789 TO 1905, at 241 (1906)).
50. See WILLIAM T. HORNER, OHIO'S KINGMAKER: MARK HANNA, MAN AND MYTH 73 (2010);
William Kolasky, Senator John Sherman and the Origin ofAntitrust, ANTITRUST, Fall 2009, at
85, 86.
s. See S. Doc. No. 97-5, at 43 (1981).
52. 19 CONG. REC. 6041 (1888).
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Texas, introduced the first bill on August 14, 1888. Reagan's bill defined "trust"
as
the combination of capital or skill by two more persons for the
following purposes:
First. To create or carry out restrictions in trade.
Second. To limit, to reduce, or to increase the production or prices
of merchandise or commodities.
Third. To prevent competition in the manufacture, making, sale, or
purchase of merchandise or commodities.
Fourth. To create a monopoly.s"
Reagan's bill made engaging in trust activities a "high misdemeanor" subject to
a ten-thousand-dollar fine and five years of imprisonment. It also included a
jurisdictional provision that implicitly invoked Congress's interstate and
foreign Commerce Clause powers."
Sherman prevailed in having Reagan's bill referred to the Finance
Committee, and then introduced his own.s Sherman's bill prohibited
all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations
made with a view, or which tend, to prevent full and free competition
in the production, manufacture, or sale of articles . . . and all
arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations . . .
designed, or which tend, to advance the cost to the consumer of any of
such articles . . .S
Sherman's bill did not criminalize these combinations; instead, it called for the
forfeiture of the charter of any corporate participant in a trust.' But it was far
from clear that Congress could strip a corporation of its state corporate charter.
This defect, and the bill's failure to include any reference to a constitutional
grant of power, Hans Thorelli notes, made Sherman's bill seem "a little
amateurish" when compared with Reagan's.ss
S3. S. 3440, 50th Cong. S 1 (1888).
54. See id. §§ 2-3.
55. 19 CONG. REC. 7513 (1888).
56. S. 3445, 5oth Cong. (as introduced by Senator Sherman, Aug. 14, 1888).
s7. Id.
58. THORELLI, supra note 48, at 170.
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In September, the Finance Committee reported out a version of Sherman's
bill that incorporated the criminalization and jurisdictional provisions of
Reagan's bill, but preserved Sherman's operational language referring to
"arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations" designed or
tending to restrict competition or raise costs for consumers.5 9 The Fiftieth
Congress then adjourned in March 1889.o
At the same time, state legislatures around the country convened for their
1889 legislative sessions and enacted a battery of state antitrust laws. Between
March and July, eight states-Kansas, Maine, North Carolina, Nebraska,
Texas, Tennessee, Missouri, and Michigan- approved antitrust statutes.6
Close on the heels of those statutes, in the summer and fall of 1889, a set
of territories in the far West-North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming,
Montana, Idaho, and Washington - gathered delegates to draft constitutions in
anticipation of impending statehood. All the constitutional conventions except
South Dakota's chose to write antitrust provisions into their first state
constitutions." The language of these statutes and constitutional provisions
tracked the development of a national conversation on how to define and
prohibit "trusts," both within and among the states, and between the states
and Congress.
Among the state statutes, two contained language similar to that used
in Sherman's and Reagan's bills in Congress. Kansas's law, passed on March 2,
1889, borrowed much of the language of Sherman's operative provision
prohibiting "arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts or combination"
tending to "prevent full and free competition" or tending to "advance, reduce
or control the price or the cost to the producer or to the consumer.""' At the
end of March, Texas's legislature adopted a law that copied Reagan's operative
definition of "trust",6  with a few changes, including the removal of any
reference to "monopoly," and the addition of a long and unwieldy catch-all
59. S. 3445 (as reported by S. Comm. on Fin., Sept. 11, 1888).
60. THORELLI, supra note 48, at 171-73.
61. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 257, 1889 Kan. Sess. Laws 389; Act of Mar. 7, 1889, ch. 266, 1889
Me. Laws 235; Act of July 1, 1889, No. 225, 1889 Mich. Pub. Acts 331; Act of May 18, 1889,
1889 Mo. Laws 96; Act of Mar. 29, 1889, ch. 69, 1889 Neb. Laws 516; Act of Mar. 11, 1889,
ch. 374, 1889 N.C. Sess. Laws 372; Act of Apr. 4, 1889, ch. 250, 1889 Tenn. Pub. Acts 475;
Act of Mar. 30, 1889, ch. 117, 1889 Tex. Gen. Laws 141.
62. See IDAHO CONST. art. XI, § 18 (1889); MONT. CONST. art. XV, § 20 (1889); N.D. CONST.
art. VII, § 146 (1889); WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 22 (1889); WYo. CONST. art. X, § 8 (1889).
South Dakota adopted a state constitutional antitrust provision in 1896. See S.D. CONST. art.
XVII, § 20.
63. § 1, 1889 Kan. Sess. Laws at 389.
64. § 1, 1889 Tex. Gen. Laws at 141.
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provision. 6s The Texas Legislature's deference to Reagan's conceptualization of
the antitrust problem is unsurprising given that, in this pre-Seventeenth
Amendment era, the legislature had elected Reagan to his Senate seat.6 The
relationship worked the other way, too: in the spring of 1890, Reagan returned
to Washington with a new bill that reflected the revisions worked in Austin
during the state legislature's 1889 session. While Kansas and Texas recycled
Congress's approaches, other states and territories experimented with new
language.
This Part highlights four developments in the states that anticipated
legislative developments in Congress. First, most states omitted any references
to the impairment of "full and free competition," or any similarly broad
"competition" language. Instead, they chose to define trusts by reference to
particular effects on the price and supply of particular articles of commerce.6 8
Second, most of the states wrote a mens rea requirement into their laws. It was
not enough that a cartel or trust had the effect of raising prices; a "trust" was a
combination formed with the purpose or intent of harming consumers.6 ' Third,
a bloc of Midwestern states-Missouri, Kansas, and Nebraska-broke up their
operative antitrust provisions into two pieces. The first section essentially
prohibited horizontal price-fixing arrangements.7 o The second section
prohibited placement of "the management or control" of a combination "in the
hands of any trustee or trustees" with a view to fixing prices or restricting
output -a prototype of the prohibition on monopoly that would emerge in the
final version of the Sherman Act.' Lastly, two states - Michigan and Texas -
included exceptions for farmers or laborers. 7
When the Fifty-First Congress returned to consider antitrust legislation in
December 1889, three major antitrust bills were introduced. The first,
Sherman's, took substantially the same form as it had at the end of the Fiftieth
6r. Id. The Texas statute was principally drafted by then-Attorney General James Hogg, who
used Reagan's bill as a model. ROBERT C. COTNER, JAMES STEPHEN HOGG: A BIOGRAPHY
163-64 (1959) (citing TOM FINTY, JR., ANTI-TRUST LEGISLATION IN TEXAS 16 (1916)).
66. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. i, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
67. See S. 62, 51st Cong. (as introduced by Senator Reagan, Dec. 4, 1889); COTNER, supra note
65, at 166.
68. See infra Parts II.A, II.B.
69. See infra Part II.C.
70. See Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 257, 5 1, 1889 Kan. Sess. Laws 389, 389; Act ofMay 18, 1889, § 1,
1889 Mo. Laws 96, 96; Act of Mar. 29, 1889, ch. 69, 5 1, 1889 Neb. Laws 516, 516-17.
p. See 5 2, 1889 Kan. Sess. Laws at 389; § 2, 1889 Mo. Laws at 96-97; § 2, 1889 Neb. Laws at
517-18.
72. See Act of July 1, 1889, No. 225, § 6, 1889 Mich. Pub. Acts 331, 333 (including an exception
for laborers and agricultural producers); Act of Mar. 30, 1889, ch. 117, 5 13, 1889 Tex. Gen.
Laws 141, 142 (including an exception for agricultural producers).
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Congress." Reagan also reintroduced his own bill with changes to the
operative "trust" definition that reflected alterations made by the Texas
Legislature the previous spring.' A third bill, introduced by Senator James
George, a Democrat from Mississippi, retained Sherman's operative definition
of "trust," but followed the lead of the Michigan and Texas legislatures by
adding a special proviso that excepted farmers and laborers from liability.7s
In January 1890, the Finance Committee reported out an amended version
of Sherman's bill that criminalized only those arrangements made "with the
intention to prevent full and free competition" or to raise prices, mirroring the
movement in the states toward the inclusion of a statutory mens rea
requirement.76 Senator George blasted this change, alleging that under the
proposed language, it would be "impossible . . . to produce a conviction" for
violation of the law.' Sherman agreed with this critique, and two months later
proposed an amendment to the bill that would eliminate the mens rea
requirement and prohibit all combinations entered "with a view or which tend
to prevent full and free competition" or "advance the cost to the consumer."7
In a brief exchange with George on the Senate floor in March, Sherman
disavowed the Committee's mens rea language and insisted that even a
"tendency" to stifle competition would make a combination illegal, though not
criminal: "The 'intention' can not be proved, though 'tendency' can. The
tendency is the test of legality. The intention is the test of a crime."' No more
was heard of the law's mens rea requirement in Senate debate.so
73. Compare S. 1, 51st Cong. (as introduced by Senator Sherman, Dec. 4, 1889), with S. 3445,
5oth Cong. (as amended and printed, Jan. 25, 1889).
74. See S. 62, 51st Cong. § 2 (as introduced by Senator Reagan, Dec. 4, 1889). Reagan's
amended bill departed from the policy of the Texas statute in one crucial respect: unlike the
state statute, it did not include an agricultural exception. Id.
7s. S. 6, 51st Cong. § 1 (as introduced by Senator George, Dec. 4, 1889).
76. S. 1 § i (as reported by Senator Sherman, Jan. 14, 1890).
77. 21 CONG. REC. 1767 (1890).
78. S. 1 § 1 (as proposed by Senator Sherman, Mar. 18, 1890) (emphasis added).
79. 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman). Note that under Sherman's March
amendment, illegal combinations were subject only to civil, and not criminal, liability; this
seems to have been a factor in Sherman's replacement of the mens rea provision with a
strict-liability regime. See id.
So. Congress's consideration of a mens rea requirement in Sherman's amended bill does not
indicate any particular legislative intent with respect to mens rea. As noted below, the final
bill issued by the Judiciary Committee, and largely written by Senator George Edmunds,
Republican ofVermont, bore only a rough resemblance to the earlier bills floated by Senator
Reagan and Senator Sherman. Senator Edmunds's bill, with its famously broad language,
was intended mainly to give the federal government the power to prosecute interstate
monopolies to the same extent that state governments prosecuted intrastate monopolies.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 51-1707, at 1 (1890); see also infra Section I.B. The best reference
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The other principal elements of the nationwide antitrust movement
showed up in the compromise Senate bill that emerged in late March. Rather
than selecting one of the Sherman, Reagan, or George bills, the Senate picked
all three: it kept Sherman's provisions for civil liability, adopted Reagan's
definition of "trust," taken from the Texas law, and his provisions for criminal
antitrust liability,8' and incorporated George's proviso shielding farmers and
laborers from liability, taken from Texas and Michigan.8 2
Meanwhile, the legislative effort in the states continued. The winter and
spring of 1890 saw the adoption of new antitrust statutes in three more states:
Mississippi, South Dakota, and North Dakota. These three states split in their
approaches to state antitrust regulation in ways that mirrored the debate in
Congress. In late February, Mississippi's legislature- breaking from the
approach favored by its own Senator George - adopted a state antitrust statute
that copied Texas's statute and Reagan's proposal in Congress.8 Just two
weeks later, South Dakota's state legislature adopted an antitrust statute that
bore a strong resemblance to the Sherman formulation, referring to
combinations preventing "free, fair and full competition" and combinations
that "ten[d] to advance the price" of certain commodities and consumer
goods.8 Meanwhile, the North Dakota Legislature chose a more laconic
enactment that tracked Missouri's statute and the constitutional provisions of
the new Western states.8' Like several other Midwestern and Plains states,
North Dakota also split its antitrust statute into two parts. The first section
dealt with horizontal price-fixing agreements, and the second dealt with
conspiracies to put the "management or control" of a combination in restraint
of trade in a monopolistic entity.
Back in Congress, the federal antitrust legislation took a sharp turn on,
March 27 when the provision-laden compromise bill that had taken shape two
days earlier was, by a narrow thirty-one to twenty-eight vote, referred to the
point for whether or not the Sherman Act carried a mens rea requirement, therefore, may be
the various items of state legislation, which constituted the broader antitrust scheme that
the Sherman Act was meant to supplement.
S. See 21 CONG. REC. 2611 (1890) (adopting Reagan's amendment by a roll call vote of thirty-
four to twelve).
82. See 21 CONG. REC. 2612 (1890) (adopting the agricultural and labor proviso by a voice vote).
83. See Act of Feb. 22, 1890, ch. 36, 1890 Miss. Laws 55.
84. Act of Mar. 7, 1890, ch. 154, 5 1, 1890 S.D. Sess. Laws 323, 323.
85. See Act of Mar. 3, 1890, ch. 174, 1890 N.D. Laws 503 (prohibiting combinations with
reference to certain price and supply effects without mentioning "competition" as such).
86. See id. SS 1-2.
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Judiciary Committee with instructions to return a polished bill within twenty
days."
The Judiciary Committee, led by Senator Edmunds, a Republican from
Vermont, returned a bill that had been stripped down to its essentials. 8 This
version removed a raft of futures regulations introduced by Senator John James
Ingalls, a Republican from Kansas,8 ' as well as the George proviso for farmers
and laborers. It followed the Reagan bill by explicitly premising itself on
Congress's Commerce Clause authority,9o and drew from the Reagan and the
Sherman bills in imposing both criminal and civil liability on antitrust
violators. 91
Yet the bill's operational provisions, which defined the scope of prohibited
combinations, resembled more the emerging consensus among state
legislatures than the bills previously advanced in Congress. The bill followed
the lead of Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, and North Dakota in splitting its
major liability provisions into a horizontal-restraint-of-trade provision (the
first section)," and a provision prohibiting any person from attempting to
control a trade or industry (the second section)." The Edmunds bill removed
all references to restraints on "free competition" and referred more simply to
restraints on "commerce" and "trade or commerce."" The bill thus echoed
state statutory and constitutional provisions that prohibited restraints on "any
article of merchandise or commodity,"95 or on "any article of manufacture or
commerce."96
The Senate and House approved this simplified bill, which went to
conference committee in mid-May." In the meantime, Kentucky passed the
last pre-Sherman Act state antitrust statute.98 Its terms were copied from those
contained in North Dakota's and Missouri's statutes, and it split the operative
87. See 21 CONG. REC. 2731 (1890).
88. See S. 1, 51st Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 2, 1890).
89. See 21 CONG. REC. 2613 (1890).
go. See S. 1 § i (prohibiting contracts "in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States"); id. § 2 (prohibiting efforts to monopolize "any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States").
g. See id. 5§ 1, 2, 7.
92. Id. § 1.
93. Id. § 2.
94. See S. 1.
95. Act of May 18, 1889, §1, 1889 Mo. Laws 96, 96; Act of Mar. 3, 1890, ch. 174, § i, 1890 N.D.
Laws 503, S03-04.
g6. N.D. CONST. art. VII, 5 146 (1889).
97. THORELI, supra note 48, at 207.
gs. Act of May 20, 1890, ch. 1621, 1889 Ky. Acts 143.
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provisions into two parts (horizontal price-fixing and monopolization),
limiting their prohibitions to restraints on "any article of property, commodity,
or merchandise." 99
In June 1890, both houses of Congress approved the bill, and President
Harrison signed it into law on July 2.100 Three days later, the Louisiana
Legislature passed an antitrust statute of its own, whose operative provisions
largely mirrored the language of the new federal law."o' With the federal
legislation complete, the conversation between Congress and the states
subsided.o2
B. Federal-State Jurisdiction and the Sherman Act
The legislative history of the Sherman Act shows not only that its drafters
were influenced by the same trends prevailing in the states, but also that
federal lawmakers used state law as their template. Congress intended for the
federal antitrust statute to provide federal jurisdiction over interstate
combinations that state laws could not reach. Debate in Congress did not focus
closely on the question of how to define trusts. That matter appears to have
been among the least contentious of the issues facing the Fiftieth Congress and
Fifty-First Congress.o3 Senators of different ideological stripes and members
of the House of Representatives saw that state and federal legislation would
need to work hand in hand to defeat the trusts. 0 4 The Sherman Act was meant
to federalize the prohibitions that had already been enacted at the state level."0 s
99. § 1, 1889 Ky. Acts at 143.
oo. See THORELLI, supra note 48, at 210.
101. See Act of July 5, 1890, No. 86, § i, 1890 La. Acts go, 91 ("[E]very contract, combination in
the form of trust, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce or to fix or limit the
amount or quantity of any article, commodity or merchandise to be manufactured, mined,
produced or sold in this State is hereby declared illegal.").
102. The states, however, continued to enact their own antitrust legislation. By 1932, only seven
states were without their own antitrust laws. See Legislation: A Collection and Survey of State
Antitrust Laws, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 347, 347 (1932).
103. See 21 CONG. REC. 3133, 3145-53 (1890); cf THORELLI, supra note 48, at 170 ("Little
intellectual effort is required to ascertain the fact that the philosophy underlying the
substantive clauses of the Sherman and Reagan bills was virtually identical.").
104. 21 CONG. REC. 3133, 3146-51 (1890).
os. Scholars have long taken note of this aspect of the Sherman Act. See Hovenkamp, supra note
26, at 375 ("The legislative history of the federal antitrust law indicates that Congress
intended to leave state antitrust enforcement more or less intact but to provide an additional
federal forum for dealing with restraints of trade which exceeded the jurisdiction of the
courts of any particular state."); James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative
Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L.
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Most of the Senate debate therefore addressed (1) the source of
constitutional authority for congressional action and (2) the proper remedy.
On the former question, members of the Senate sought to ground the new
antitrust legislation in Congress's Article I interstate commerce power, o6 its
Article I taxing power, 0 7 or its Article III power to define and prescribe rules
for federal courts' exercise of jurisdiction."os The question of Congress's
constitutional authority was tightly connected to its remedial power. Senator
Reagan's assertion of Commerce Clause authority, for instance, allowed him to
propose criminal sanctions for trust violators.109 For Democratic Senator
George and Democratic Senator George Vest, who questioned Congress's
power to prohibit trusts under the Commerce Clause,"0 the alternative
invocation of Congress's power to lay and collect taxes and import duties
provided an attractive remedy: opening up the trusts to foreign competition by
stripping them of tariff protection (a major Democratic policy goal at the
time)."' The major policy implications of the constitutional and remedial
questions ensured that these issues received the lion's share of contentious
debate in the Senate."'
By contrast, on the question of how "trusts" would be defined -that is,
what kinds of combinations or agreements would be unlawful-there was a
strong consensus in the Senate that the federal antitrust law would render
illegal those same combinations prohibited by state law. Senator Sherman
described the complementary relationship between the federal law and state
laws:
REV. 495, 503-04 (1987); Note, The Commerce Clause and State Antitrust Regulation, 61
COLUM. L. REv. 1469, 1473-74 (1961).
io6. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; S. 3440, Soth Cong. § 2 (as introduced by Senator Reagan,
Aug. 14, 1888) (prohibiting the activities of any trust "in any trade or business carried on
with foreign countries, or between the States").
107. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. i; S. 6, 51st Cong. § 3 (as introduced by Senator George, Dec.
4, 1889) (permitting the suspension of "duties or import taxes" on articles of commerce
controlled by trusts).
1o8. See U.S. CONST. art. III, 5 2; 21 CONG. REc. 2460-61 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman); S.
6 S 2 (as introduced by Senator George, Dec. 4, 1889) (restricting federal jurisdiction with
regard to suits brought to enforce illegal combinations in restraint of trade).
log. See S. 3440 § 2 (as introduced by Senator Reagan, Aug. 14, 1888).
11o. See 21 CONG. REC. 2465 (1890) (statement of Sen. Vest); 21 CONG. REC. 1768-72 (1890)
(statement of Sen. George).
ill. See S. 6 § 3 (as introduced by Senator George, Dec. 4, 1889); Richard C. Edwards, Economic
Sophistication in Nineteenth Century Congressional TariffDebates, 30 J. ECON. HIST. 802, 821-22
(1970).
112. See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. 2460-68, 2470-73 (1890); 20 CONG. REC. 1458-1462 (1889); see also
THORELLI, supra note 48, at 170-99.
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This bill, as I would have it, has for its single object to invoke the aid of
the courts of the United States to ... supplement the enforcement of
the established rules of the common and statute law by the courts of the
several States in dealing with combinations that affect injuriously the
industrial liberty of the citizens of these States. It is to arm the Federal
courts within the limits of their constitutional power that they may co-
operate with the State courts in checking, curbing, and controlling the
most dangerous combinations that now threaten the business,
property, and trade of the people of the United States."'
The purpose of the law, then, was to take the law of the states and apply it
federally, so that interstate combinations could not escape the regulation of
state legislatures and courts, whose powers over out-of-state corporations were
limited at that time by the dormant Commerce Clause"4 and the territorial
restrictions of personal jurisdiction under the rule of Pennoyer v. Neff."s
Sherman characterized these limitations on state power as the spur for
federal action:
Similar contracts in any State in the Union are now, by common or
statute law, null and void. Each State can and does prevent and control
combinations within the limit of the State. This we do not propose to
interfere with. The power of the State courts has been repeatedly
exercised to set aside such combinations as I shall hereafter show, but
these courts are limited in their jurisdiction to the State, and, in our
complex system of government, are admitted to be unable to deal with
the great evil that now threatens us."'
According to Sherman, the new law would set up a state-federal jurisdictional
division of labor: "If the combination is confined to a State the State should
apply the remedy; if it is interstate and controls any production in many States,
Congress must apply the remedy.""' For this dual jurisdiction, the same rules
would apply. Sherman explained that the federal law "will enable the courts of
the United States to restrain, limit, and control such combinations as interfere
injuriously with our foreign and interstate commerce, to the same extent that
113. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (emphasis added).
114. See Andrew I. Gavil, Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Foundation of Antitrust Federalism, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 657, 678-83 (1993).
115. 95 U.S. 714 (1878); see Hovenkamp, supra note 26, at 379-82.
116. 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
117. Id. at 2457.
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the State courts habitually control such combinations as interfere with the
commerce of a State.",n8
Senator Vest of Missouri, who objected to Sherman's proposal on
constitutional grounds, going so far as to question Sherman's capacity as a
lawyer,' 9 nevertheless agreed with him about the basic structure of federal
antitrust law. It would provide a remedy that would incorporate and fill in the
gaps of state antitrust law:
I believe there is a remedy if you take the jurisdiction of the State
and also the jurisdiction of Congress and put them together, but I
do not believe there is any complete remedy in the action of either
separately ....
I do not think there is any difficulty whatever as to that class
of cases in which the products, or the transactions, to speak
more accurately, take place entirely within the limits of a State; but we
know that these trusts evade the State statutes even when they are
made ... . 2
And Senator Reagan told his colleagues that whatever federal legislation they
crafted would supplement a national antitrust regime established primarily in
the states:
[I]f the people of this country expect salutary relief on this subject they
must look to their State governments, for they have jurisdiction over
the great mass of transactions out of which these troubles grow. If the
Federal Government will act upon those things which relate to
international and interstate commerce, and the States, responding to
the necessity of the country and the complaints of the people, will act
upon the branch of subjects of which the States have jurisdiction, we
may, it seems to me, arrest the evil of trusts and combinations ....
This understanding of the law's purpose and meaning was also adopted
and articulated by the House of Representatives. The House Judiciary
118. Id. at 2456.
iig. See 21 CONG. REC. 2464-65 (1890) (statement of Sen. Vest).
120. Id. at 2465.
121. 21 CONG. REC. 2469 (1890) (statement of Sen. Reagan); see also 21 CONG. REC. 2601 (1890)
(statement of Sen. Reagan) (explaining that when Congress had "exhausted [its] power
under the commerce clause . . . then the people must rely upon the Legislatures of the
several States for the rest of the legislation on [trusts and combinations]").
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Committee's report on the bill to the full House carefully explained that the bill
was designed to complement, not supplant, state law:
No attempt is made to invade the legislative authority of the several
States or even to occupy doubtful grounds. No system of laws can be
devised by Congress alone which would effectually protect the people
of the United States against the evils and oppression of trusts and
monopolies. Congress has no authority to deal, generally, with the
subject within the States, and the States have no authority to legislate in
respect of commerce between the several States or with foreign nations.
It follows, therefore, that the legislative authority of Congress and that
of the several States must be exerted to secure the suppression of
restraints upon trade and monopolies. Whatever legislation Congress
may enact on this subject, within the limits of its authority, will prove
of little value unless the States shall supplement it by such auxiliary and
proper legislation as may be within their legislative authority.m
Such statements indicate that, in enacting the Sherman Act, Congress saw itself
as establishing a federal antitrust jurisdiction that was only one part of a
coherent national regulatory system, rooted in the "established rules of the
common and statute law" of the states. This "integrated scheme" of
regulation presents a classic in pari materia case for intertextual statutory
interpretation." The states' statutory declarations of policy thus form the
essential backdrop for understanding the federal law's broad prohibition on
monopolies and arrangements "in restraint of trade or commerce." 25
II. THE STATES' CONSUMER-WELFARE POLICY
With the Sherman Act, Congress committed the federal government to a
national program of trust regulation first initiated in the states. This Part
identifies the states' antitrust policy by examining the text of the states'
antitrust legislation.
Popular frustration with trusts was not evenly distributed across the United
States. Figure 1 displays a map of states that adopted state antitrust statutes or
constitutional provisions prior to the signing of the Sherman Act in July 1890.
122. H.R. RP. No. 51-1707, at 1 (1890).
123. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
124. See NELSON, supra note 25, at 487 ("[W]hen courts conclude that two statutes are part of an
integrated scheme, courts will resist reading those statutes to work at cross-purposes. ...
[C]ourts often try to resolve indeterminacies in one statute in a way that keeps the statute in
tune with the policies behind other statutes that are in pari materia.").
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
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Figure i.
STATE ANTITRUST LEGISLATION BEFORE THE SHERMAN ACT6
As Figure 1 illustrates, early state antitrust legislation was a regional
phenomenon that occurred principally in the Midwest and Plains states and the
newly created states of the Mountain West and Pacific Northwest. Several
states of the old Confederacy also enacted early antitrust legislation. Maine was
the sole New England state to pass antitrust legislation, and the Mid-Atlantic
region was not represented.
This pattern of legislative adoption across predominantly agricultural states
is consistent with most historical accounts, which typically credit populist
farmers and their interest groups- among them, The Grange and the Farmers'
Alliance-with sowing the seeds of antitrust policy in the late nineteenth
iz6. Note that, despite the fifty-state image displayed above, at the time of the Sherman Act's
adoption on July 2, 1890, Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah,
and Wyoming had not yet been admitted to the Union as states. Idaho and Wyoming, each
of which was admitted shortly after the passage of the Sherman Act, approved antitrust
provisions in their state constitutional conventions prior to their admission as states and
prior to the adoption of the Sherman Act. See IDAHO CONST. art. XI, § 18 (1889); Wyo.
CONST. art. X, S 8 (1889).
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century."' These same historical accounts sometimes suggest that the populists
pushing the development of state antitrust legislation intended for such
legislation to serve as a protectionist bulwark against out-of-state corporations.
This view of state antitrust legislation, which draws upon broad readings of
economic and social history, credits state laws as flexible tools for "restor[ing]
the balance of economic power" writ large.`8 In other words, antitrust
legislation was not so much a regime to protect consumers as an effort by small
businessmen and farmers to wring profits out of powerful corporate
competitors and suppliers.` 9
This Note departs from past approaches by examining the contents of the
state antitrust statutes themselves. By and large, the statutory language does
not support the view that the agricultural states of the South and West adopted
antitrust legislation as protectionist or as "anti-bigness" weapons against the
advances of powerful corporations. The prairie populists-or at least the pieces
of legislation they enacted-were doing something else: they were prohibiting
only those combinations and business practices that harmed consumers
through restrictions on the production of a given commodity or article of
commerce. In other words, they were working toward a policy of consumer
welfare.
Before examining the language of the statutes, a brief explanation of
"consumer welfare"-a term subject to some disputeo in the antitrust
community today-is required. This Note adopts Herbert Hovenkamp's
definition of consumer welfare, which is based on his observation of the policy
of American antitrust regulators and courts: "[A]ntitrust policy in the United
States follows a consumer welfare approach in that it condemns restraints that
127. See, e.g., COTNER, supra note 65, at 160-61; THORELLI, supra note 48, at 58-62, 143-44; Frank
H. Easterbrook, Commentary, Antitrust 1889, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 150, 153-54 (1990); Letwin,
supra note 35, at 232-33; Millon, supra note 46, at 141.
iz8. Millon, supra note 46, at 149; see, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 127, at 152 (noting that a
"booming economy" at the time of the state statutes' adoption leads Easterbrook to "doubt
some of Professor Millon's explanation" that aggregation of economic power "threatened
American ideals" and led to the rise of state antitrust statutes); Millon, supra note 46, at 143
(appealing to a spirit of egalitarianism rooted in the tradition of "Thomas Jefferson's
idealistic vision of a nation of independent property owners of roughly equal economic
stature").
ing. Millon, supra note 46, at 149; see also Easterbrook, supra note 127, at 153 (hypothesizing that
state antitrust laws were designed to "allocate [railroad] gains to the farmers" and "tur[n]
the screws on the railroads"). But see George J. Stigler, The Origin of the Sherman Act, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-3 (1985).
130. See generally Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L.
& ECON. 133 (zon1) (arguing that use of the term "consumer welfare" has obscured the
distinctions between more nuanced antitrust enforcement goals, including consumer
surplus and total welfare).
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actually result in monopoly output reductions, whether or not there are
offsetting efficiencies and regardless of their size.""' Under this definition,
consumer welfare refers to the preservation of consumer surplus generated
under conditions of allocative efficiency, in which the price of an article of
commerce is determined by its marginal cost of production. Prices and output
in a market characterized by allocative efficiency are Pareto optimal, which
means that any contrary allocation of resources would end up harming one or
more market participants.
What does allocative efficiency look like? The outline is a familiar one.
Consider a retail automotive market for sedans. Under ideal conditions,
carmakers like Ford or Volkswagen will seek to maximize profits by making
and selling as many of these cars as possible. They will make sedans until they
can no longer profit from sales-- that is, until the price of the last vehicle sold
equals the marginal cost of its production (marginal cost). Consumers will
purchase the sedans so long as the value consumers derive from them
(marginal benefit) is greater than or equal to the purchase price. The price is
set where marginal benefit equals marginal cost, so that the maximum number
of sedans is produced at the lowest possible price. This price and output level is
allocatively efficient and Pareto optimal because, without a change in the
supply or demand curves, neither the carmakers' profits ("producer surplus")
nor the consumers' value-for-money ("consumer surplus") can be increased
without decreasing the other.
As Hovenkamp explains, antitrust policy in the United States follows a
"consumer welfare" approach in that it condemns "monopoly output
reductions" -that is, instances where a producer (or group of producers) with
sufficient market power to set overall market output has decreased output to
increase producer surplus." 2 This increase in producer surplus comes at the
expense of consumer surplus, since consumers must pay above-market prices.
It also creates "deadweight loss," or the destruction of wealth that would have
been created for consumers and producers if output remained at the Pareto-
optimal level. The welfare consequences of allocative inefficiency in a
monopoly market are illustrated in Figure 2.
131. Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust's Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471, 2477
(2013); see also Phillip Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 52 ANTrrRuST L.J. 523, 535
(1983) ("Some argue that output volume is the exclusive measure of consumer welfare. As a
first and generally decisive test, it is indeed often useful to ask whether a challenged
arrangement reduces output.").
132. Hovenkamp, supra note 131, at 2477.
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Figure 2.
WELFARE CONSEQUENCES OF MONOPOLY OUTPUT REDUCTION' 33
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Simply put, a consumer-welfare policy aims to preserve consumer surplus
by prohibiting these reductions of output. This is the policy of antitrust law in
the United States today, and, as this Part argues, it was the antitrust policy
adopted by state legislatures across the country from 1888 to 1890.
Consider Missouri's antitrust statute,' which bore a close resemblance to
several of the pre-Sherman Act state antitrust measures. 3 s A full reproduction
of its operative provisions conveys the statute's purposes:
133. Nicolas Petit, A Proposed Interpretation of the EC] Ruling in GSK (C-468/o6 to C-478/o6)




134. Act of May 18, 1889, 1889 Mo. Laws 96.
135. The core language of Missouri's antitrust statute was also used in the statutes crafted by
legislatures in Kentucky and North Dakota. See Act of May 20, 1890, ch. 1621, 1889 Ky. Acts
143; Act of Mar. 3, 1890, ch. 174, 1890 N.D. Laws 503. State constitutional conventions in
Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, and Washington relied on similar language for their
respective state constitutions. See IDAHO CONST. art. XI, § 18 (1889); MONT. CONST. art.
XV, § 20 (1889); N.D. CONST. art. VII, § 146 (1889); WASH. CONST. art. 12, § 22 (1889). It
was also closely echoed in nearly every other state enactment, as discussed below.
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SECTION 1. If any corporation organized under the laws of this or
any other state or country, for transacting or conducting any kind of
business in this state, or any partnership or individual or other
association of persons whosoever, shall create, enter into, become a
member of or a party to any pool, trust, agreement, combination,
confederation or understanding with any other corporation,
partnership, individual, or any other person or association of persons,
to regulate or fix the price of any article of merchandise or commodity,
or shall enter into, become a member of or a party to any pool,
agreement, contract, combination or confederation to fix or limit the
amount or quantity of any article, commodity or merchandise, to be
manufactured, mined, produced or sold in this state, shall be deemed
and adjudged guilty of a conspiracy to defraud, and be subject to
indictment and punishment as provided in this act.
SEC. 2. It shall not be lawful for any corporation to issue or to own
trust certificates, or for any corporation, agent, officer or employes [sic],
or the directors or stockholders of any corporation, to enter into any
combination, contract or agreement with any person or persons,
corporation or corporations, or with any stockholder or director
thereof, the purpose and effect of which combination, contract or
agreement shall be to place the management or control of such
combination or combinations, or the manufactured product thereof, in
the hands of any trustee or trustees, with the intent to limit or fix the
price or lessen the production and sale of any article of commerce, use
or consumption, or to prevent, restrict or diminish the manufacture or
output of any such article."'
Reduced to its critical language, section i of the Missouri law prohibited
any "agreement . .. to regulate or fix the price of any article of merchandise or
commodity, or . . . to fix or limit the amount or quantity of any article,
commodity or merchandise, to be manufactured, mined, produced or sold in
this state." Section 2 of the law prohibited monopolization, just like section 2 of
the Sherman Act."' Though the statute does not use the word "monopoly," the
language of the statute unambiguously refers to activities that we would now
call monopolistic."' It also uses the language of "trusts," which then connoted
136. §§ 1-2, 1889 Mo. Laws at 96-97.
137. Compare 5 2, 1889 Mo. Laws at 96-97, with 15 U.S.C. S 2 (2012).
138. See Monopoly, BLACK'S LAw DIcIONARY (loth ed. 2014) ("A monopoly is created when, as
the result of efforts to that end, previously competing businesses are so concentrated in the
hands of a single person or corporation, or a few persons or corporations acting together,
that they have power, for all practical purposes, to control the prices of a commodity . . . ."
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a meaning we would now understand as synonymous with monopolies."' A
single business organization and its agents could be liable under section 2
where the organization was structured "with the intent to limit orfix the price or
lessen the production and sale of any article of commerce, use or consumption, or
to prevent, restrict or diminish the manufacture or output of any such article.""o
Three conclusions may be drawn from the face of this statute's definition of
liability for conspiracies in restraint of trade. First, agreements and
combinations that did not reduce output and raise prices did not run afoul of
the law. Second, Missouri lawmakers cared about price and output effects on
particular commodities and articles of merchandise, not overall social output or
price effects. Third, under the antimonopoly provision of section 2, a business
organization had to act with "the intent" to control output or prices.
Monopolies achieved through productive efficiency, without any intention of
controlling prices or output, did not violate the terms of the statute.
As explained below, each of these three basic features turned up in a
majority of the states' antitrust statutes or constitutional provisions. Together,
they formed the states' original consumer-welfare policy at the time of the
Sherman Act's adoption.
A. Prohibition ofRestraints on Output and Prices
At the heart of most of the states' antitrust enactments were concrete,
specific definitions of antitrust liability. Table i shows the state-by-state
breakdown of approaches on the first prong of the states' consumer-welfare
policy: a textual focus on price and output controls.
(quoting 54 A AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices § 781
(1996))).
139. See WEBsTER's INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 1547 (1891) (defining a "trust" as an
"organization formed mainly for the purpose of regulating the supply and price of
commodities, etc.; as, a sugar trust").
140. § 2,1889 Mo. Laws at 96, 97 (emphasis added).
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Tablei.
REFERENCE TO PRICE AND OUTPUT RESTRAINTS 141
Prohibits Only Combinations To
Fix Prices and Output
Iowa statute
Kansas statute
(Section 2 trust prohibition)
Kentucky statute
Prohibits Combinations To Fix Prices and
Output, and Includes Other Language
Kansas statute (section i cartel prohibition)
Michigan statute
Mississippi statute
Maine statute South Dakota statute
Missouri statute Tennessee statute
Nebraska statute Texas statute








As Table 1 illustrates, a majority of the state enactments prohibiting trusts
and other conspiracies in trade referred only to conspiracies to "fix or limit the
amount or quantity" of production and to "regulate or fix the price" of
consumer goods. These legislatures and constitutional conventions understood
the connection between supply and demand, and the terms of the statutes
reflect a policy of promoting allocative efficiency.
Consider North Carolina's antitrust statute, which defined "trust" in these
terms:
[A]n arrangement, understanding or agreement, either private or
public . . . for the purpose of increasing or reducing the price of the
shares of stock of any company or corporation, or of any class of
products, materials or manufactured articles, beyond the price that would
be fixed by the natural demand for or the supply of such shares, products,
materials or manufactured articles... *
141. See sources cited supra note 41.
142. Act of Mar. 11, 1889, ch. 374, § 2, 1889 N.C. Sess. Laws 372, 372-73 (emphasis added). The
North Carolina statute also prohibited arrangements "reducing" prices, but this was not a
prohibition on productive efficiencies that reduced prices by changing the supply curve; it
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This understanding of "trusts" and their harms was shared across the
continent in the emerging states of the far West, whose entry into the Union
realigned American politics by facilitating a rural coalition of Southern and
Western states capable of sustaining a "rising tide of Populism."43 The depth
of antitrust feeling in this region was such that the states chose to write
antitrust provisions into their first state constitutions.' But they adopted an
antitrust framework that reflected the same policy principle articulated in
Missouri and North Carolina. Constitutional delegates in Washington, Idaho,
Montana, and North Dakota condemned only those agreements that had the
effect of raising consumer prices through restrictions on output.s4 Typical
among these was the Montana Constitution, which provided:
No incorporation, stock company, person or association of persons in
the state of Montana, shall directly, or indirectly, combine or form what
is known as a trust, or make any contract with any person or persons,
corporation, or stock company, foreign or domestic, through their
stockholders, trustees, or in any manner whatever, for the purpose of
fixing the price, or regulating the production of any article of
commerce, or of the product of the soil, for consumption by the
people."
Even in states where antitrust legislation departed from the easily
comprehensible formulations offered by the likes of Missouri, North Carolina,
and Montana, antitrust laws targeted conspiracies to reduce output. Nebraska,
for instance, adopted a two-part statute that resembled the final version of the
was a prohibition on anticompetitive product dumping, as the statute went on to explain:
"[A] ny merchant, broker, manufacturer or dealers in raw materials of any kind, or the agent
of such persons, who shall sell any particular class of goods, raw materials or manufactured
articlesfor less than [the] actual cost for the purpose of breaking down competitors, shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor.. . ." 5, 1889 N.C. Sess. Laws at 373 (emphasis added).
143. Scott C. James, Prelude to Progressivism: Party Decay, Populism, and the Doctrine of "Free and
Unrestricted Competition" in American Antitrust Policy, 1890-1897, 13 STUD. Am. POL. DEV. 288,
303 (1999).
144. These explicitly anti-trust constitutional provisions should not be confused with older state
constitutional provisions, preceding the advent of industrial trusts, that prohibited
"monopolies" in the older sense, meaning publicly granted charters of exclusive dealing. See,
e.g., MD. CONST. art. XXXIX (1776) ("[M]onopolies are odious, contrary to the spirit of a
free government and the principles of commerce, and ought not to be suffered.").
145. IDAHO CONST. art. XI, 5 18 (1889); MONT. CONsT. art. XV, 5 20 (1889); N.D. CONST. art.
VII, 5 146 (1889); WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 22 (1889). Wyoming opted for a wider-scoped
antitrust provision prohibiting combinations "to prevent competition, to control or
influence productions or prices thereof, or in any manner to interfere with the public good
and general welfare." Wyo. CONST. art. X, S 8 (1889).
146. MONT. CONST. art. XV, 5 20 (1889).
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Sherman Act: its first section prohibited cartel arrangements in which "a
common price shall be fixed for any . . . article or product, or whereby the
manufacture or sale thereof shall be limited" ;1 its second section prohibited
"[p]ooling . . in the nature of what are commonly called trusts, for any
purpose whatever," without defining the kind of behavior that constituted a
trust." 8 But reference to contemporary sources makes clear that what was
"commonly called" a trust in this era-an "organization formed mainly for the
purpose of regulating the supply and price of commodities" 49 - was
understood as the same kind of output-restricting combination condemned by
Nebraska's neighbors, Missouri5 o and Iowa.'
A sizeable minority of states adopted provisions with more general
principles, in addition to price-fixing output restrictions. Michigan's antitrust
statute, for example, prohibited combinations
the purpose or object or intent of which shall be to limit, control, or in
any manner to restrict or regulate the amount of production or the
quantity of any article or commodity to be raised or produced by
mining, manufacture, agriculture or any other branch of business or
labor, or to enhance, control or regulate the market price thereof, or in
any manner to prevent or restrict free competition in the production or
sale of any such article or commodity."'
Though Michigan's legislature did not hew narrowly to the language employed
in other states, its only deviation from the formulaic recitation of market prices
and output was a prohibition on combinations "prevent[ing] or restrict[ing]
free competition in the production or sale" of a commodity.' But the
legislature's invocation of this broad policy goal on the heels of specific and
narrowly tailored criteria for liability is a classic instance where courts would
apply the ejusdem generis canon, which provides, "Where general words follow
specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are [usually]
construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects
147. Act of Mar. 29, 1889, ch. 69, § 1, 1889 Neb. Laws 516, 516-17.
148. 5 2, 1889 Neb. Laws at 517-18; see also Act of Mar. 7, 1889, ch. 266, 5 1, 1889 Me. Laws 235,
235 (prohibiting the organization of "any trust," but leaving the term undefined).
149. WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 139, at 1547.
i5o. Act of May 18, 1889, 1889 Mo. Laws 96.
151. Act of Apr. 16, 1888, ch. 84, 51, 1888 Iowa Acts 124, 124 (prohibiting any agreement "to
regulate or fix the price of. . [any] commodity or article . . . or limit the amount or
quantity of any commodity or article to be manufactured, mined, produced, or sold in this
State").
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enumerated by the preceding specific words."' The same principle of
construction would apply to the antitrust statutes of Tennessee's and South
Dakota,s5 as well as the Wyoming Constitution's antitrust provision,s7 all of
which combined specific references to price-fixing and output restrictions with
broad, almost nonjusticiable appeals to "legitimate trade" and the "public
good."
Only three states-Kansas, Texas, and Mississippi-attempted to define a
broader antitrust policy. These three stood outside the consensus policy of the
other states, which limited antitrust liability to combinations designed to
depress output and raise prices for consumers. Kansas, which promulgated a
standard monopolization provision in section 2 of its antitrust statute,1s also
crafted a broader prohibition in section i designed to protect consumers and
producers from changes in price. It prohibited not only arrangements
impairing "full and free competition," but also all combinations "which tend to
advance, reduce or control the price or the cost to the producer or to the
consumer of any such products or articles."'59 It thus reached business
organizations that lowered prices for consumers while hurting other producers
or suppliers in the process, either through productive efficiency or through
monopsony power.
Texas's law (and Mississippi's,i60 which copied Texas's operative definition
nearly word for word) enacted similarly broad prohibitions. Its antitrust
statute defined "trust" by way of five illegal purposes: first, to "create or carry
out restrictions in trade"; second, to limit production or increase or reduce
prices; third, to "prevent competition"; fourth, to fix prices "at any standard or
figure"; and fifth, to enter into an "agreement of any kind . . . to pool,
combine, or unite any interest . . . with the sale or transportation of any such
154. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1o86 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Wash.
State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 384
(2003)).
155. See Act of Apr. 4, 1889, ch. 250, § 1, 1889 Tenn. Pub. Acts 475, 475 (prohibiting "any
trust . . . to limit the supply or production of said articles . .. or to create a monopoly or
corner in the same" while also broadly condemning the formation of a trust to produce
articles "for the purpose of injuriously affecting . .. legitimate trade and commerce").
156. See Act of Mar. 7, 1890, ch. 154, 5§ 1-2, 1890 S.D. Sess. Laws 323, 323-24 (condemning any
combination "that tends to advance the price to the user or consumer of any article or
commodity . . . beyond the reasonable cost of production or manufacture" or any
combination tending "to prevent a free, fair and full competition").
157. WYo. CONST. art. X, § 8 (1889).
158. See Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 257, S 2, 1889 Kan. Sess. Laws 389, 389.
159. § 1, 1889 Kan. Sess. Laws at 389 (emphasis added).
16o. See Act of Feb. 22, 1890, ch. 36, § 1, 1890 Miss. Laws 55, 55-56.
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article or commodity that its price might in any manner be affected."'6 ' Like the
Kansas statute, Texas's prohibition on combinations that had any effect on
commodity prices could be used to punish businesses that succeeded in
lowering consumer prices through new productive efficiencies. This was not a
narrow consumer-protection statute; it was a legislative sledgehammer
designed with what one scholar and one corporate lawyer called "an intent to
terrify" big business.162
This "intent to terrify" is noteworthy because it was an outlier among the
states' antitrust policies. Texas's unique approach is especially significant given
that it was one of the early movers in state antitrust legislation. Ten of the
eleven states6, (all except Mississippi) that adopted antitrust legislation after
Texas but before the Sherman Act eschewed Texas's wide-ranging prohibitions
and followed the approach of Iowa and Missouri, proscribing only business
arrangements that impaired allocative efficiency.
B. Reference to Particular Commodities and Articles of Commerce
The second prong of the states' consumer-welfare policy was its
commitment to preserving allocative efficiency with respect to the production
of particular commodities and articles of commerce. The state statutes sought
to keep price and output in individual product markets at their natural,
competitive level; they did not seek to maximize social welfare.164 Table 2
tracks the state statutes' references to effects on particular commodities and
articles of commerce. As Table 2 indicates, a majority of jurisdictions used
legislative language focused on price and output effects for discrete classes of
products.
161. Act of Mar. 30, 1889, ch. 117, § 1, 1889 Tex. Gen. Laws 141, 141 (emphasis added).
162. Joseph A. Pratt & Mark E. Steiner, "An Intent to Terrify": State Antitrust in the Formative Years
of the Modern Oil Industry, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 270, 275 (1990) (quoting 2 CLARENCE
WHARTON, TEXAS UNDER MANY FLAGS 418 (1930)).
163. IDAHO CONST. art. XI, 5 18 (1889); MONT. CONST. art. XV, S 20 (1889); N.D. CONST. art.
VII, § 146 (1889); WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 22 (1889); WYo. CONST. art. X, § 8 (1889); Act
of May 20, 1890, ch. 1621, 1889 Ky. Acts 143; Act of July 1, 1889, No. 225, 1889 Mich. Pub.
Acts 331; Act of May 18, 1889, 1889 Mo. Laws 96; Act of Mar. 3, 1890, ch. 174, 1890 N.D.
Laws 5o3; Act of Mar. 7, 1890, ch. 154, 1890 S.D. Sess. Laws 323; Act of Apr. 4, 1889, ch. 250,
1889 Tenn. Pub. Acts 475.
164. For a more detailed discussion of the difference between achieving allocative efficiency
within a single market and maximizing overall social output, see infra Part III.
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Table 2.
REFERENCE TO EFFECTS ON PARTICULAR ARTICLES OF COMMERCE' 6s
Statute or Provision Only Prohibits Language Sweeps Broadly To Prohibit
Behavior Affecting the Trade of "Restrictions in Trade" or Interference with
Particular Articles of Commerce "the Public Good"
Iowa statute Mississippi statute
Kansas statute Texas statute












North Dakota constitutional provision
Under this prong of the states' original consumer-welfare policy, violators
of the antitrust laws must have actually raised the prevailing price or lowered
the total output of some particular "product of the soil or . . . article of
manufacture or commerce," as the North Dakota Constitution provided.' 6 6
Two state statutes even went so far as to provide nonexhaustive lists of such
products: Iowa enumerated "oil, lumber, coal, grain, flour, provisions or any
other commodity or article whatever";, 6, South Dakota reeled off "farm
machinery, implements, tools, supplies, and lumber, wood and coal," and also
referred specifically to product dumping in "wheat, corn, oats, barley, flax,
cattle, sheep, hogs, or other farm or agricultural products." 6 s Other states used
more general terms, such as "the price of any merchandise,", 6 9 or "any article
or commodity to be raised or produced by mining, manufacture, agriculture or
165. See sources cited supra note 41.
166. N.D. CONST. art. VII, § 146 (1889).
167. Act of Apr. 16, 1888, ch. 84, 5 1, 1888 Iowa Acts 124, 124.
168. Act of Mar. 7, 1890, ch. 154, § 1, i89o S.D. Sess. Laws 323, 323-24.
169. Act of May 20, 1890, ch. 1621, § 1, 1889 Ky. Acts 143, 143.
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any other branch of business or labor," 7 or "any article of commerce, use, or
consumption."17 ' Even Michigan's statute, which referred in broad terms to the
impairment of "free competition," referred to the restriction of such
competition specifically "in the production or sale of any such article or
commodity." 7 2
Here, too, Mississippi and Texas adopted statutes that diverged from the
consensus policy: their definition of trust encompassed any "restrictions in
trade," without explicit textual regard to price effects on particular
commodities or goods."' But this broader language represented a minority
position: the text of nearly every state antitrust law adopted a clearer standard
for liability that was focused on price and output effects with regard to
particular markets.
C. Mens Rea Requirement
Lastly, a majority of state statutes and constitutional provisions prohibited
only business practices that exhibited a purpose or intent to restrict output and
control prices. Although several states criminalized or prohibited arrangements
that merely resulted in a restriction on output, the bulk of states took a
narrower approach. Table 3 lists the states' liability standards for cartel and
trust prohibitions.
170. Act of July 1, 1889, No. 225, § 1, 1889 Mich. Pub. Acts 331, 332.
1i. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 257, § 2, 1889 Kan. Sess. Laws 389, 389.
172. § 1, 1889 Mich. Pub. Acts at 332.
173. See Act of Feb. 22, 1890, ch. 36, § 1, 1890 Miss. Laws 55, 55-56; Act of Mar. 30, 1889, ch. 117,
§ 1, 1889 Tex. Gen. Laws 141, 141.
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Table 3.
MENS REA STANDARDS174
Statute or Provision Requires an Illegal
Intent or Purpose Negligence Liability Standard
Iowa statute Kansas statute (section 1 cartel ban)
Kansas statute (section 2 trust ban) Kentucky statute (section 2 trust ban)
Kentucky statute (section i cartel ban) Mississippi statute
Maine statute Texas statute
Michigan statute North Dakota constitutional provision









North Carolina, for example, prohibited only those arrangements "entered
into . . . for the purpose" of fixing prices. 75 Michigan proscribed agreements
with the "purpose or object or intent" to control output."' Tennessee banned
combinations "for the purpose of injuriously affecting the legitimate trade and
commerce . . . or to limit the supply or production . . . for the purpose of
speculation."" Three states-Kansas, Kentucky, and North Dakota-split
their antitrust policies with regard to mens rea. Kansas's prohibition on
horizontal arrangements in restraint of trade covered all arrangements "made
with a view or which tend to prevent . . . competition,""" but its
antimonopolization provision required "intent to . . . lessen the production" of
an article of commerce.'7 9 Kentucky did just the reverse, requiring proof of
intent or purpose with respect to horizontal arrangements but imposing strict
174. See sources cited supra note 41.
175. Act of Mar. 11, 1889, ch. 374, § 2, 1889 N.C. Sess. Laws 372, 372-73.
176. § 1, 1889 Mich. Pub. Acts at 332.
177. Act of Apr. 4, 1889, ch. 250, § 1, 1889 Tenn. Pub. Acts 475, 475.
178. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 257, § 1, 1889 Kan. Sess. Laws 389, 389 (emphasis added).
179. Id.
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liability for the antimonopolization provision of the statute."so The North
Dakota Constitution prohibited any combination "having for its object or
effect",8, the fixing of prices or production but limited criminal penalties in its
statutory antitrust enactment to "agreement[s] ... to regulate or fix" prices or
output."'
North Dakota's example is instructive. Except for the constitutional
provisions, the states' legislative antitrust enactments were criminal statutes, so
a consensus policy in favor of a mens rea requirement is unsurprising: the
maxim that "[t]here can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind",8, is
an enduring principle of English and American law.'8 ' Although several states
chose to pursue the trusts more aggressively by making trust-like behavior a
strict-liability crime, most states chose to follow a more traditional mens rea
approach in the criminal law governing the trusts.
III. APPLYING THE ORIGINAL CONSUMER-WELFARE POLICY
Vhen Congress enacted the Sherman Act, it borrowed a consumer-welfare
policy from the states. That policy is the prevention of deadweight loss
resulting from monopoly output reductions in individual markets for goods
and services. Antitrust law should concern itself with no more than this, and no
less. More pointedly, this approach entails navigating a middle course between
the Scylla of a "total-welfare" model on one side, and the Charybdis of an
ambiguous "competition" theory of antitrust on the other.
A. Rejection ofDueling Efficiencies and Williamson's "Nafve Tradeoff'
Scholars have debated how courts ought to weigh conflicts between two
kinds of efficiency: allocative efficiency and productive efficiency. As we have
seen, allocative efficiency is a Pareto optimal market state in which the price for
a given product is equal to its marginal cost, and under which consumer and
producer surplus is maximized. Productive efficiency simply refers to a reduced
marginal cost of production, and is associated with the kind of cost savings we
commonly think of as "efficiency," including reduced labor or overhead costs.
In a market characterized by allocative efficiency, productive efficiencies are
iso. See Act of May 2o, 1890, ch. 1621, 1889 Ky. Acts 143.
18i. N.D. CONST. art. VII, § 146 (1889) (emphasis added).
182. Act of Mar. 3, 1890, ch. 174, 5 1, 1890 N.D. Laws 503, 503.
183. Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 974 (1932) (quoting I JOEL PRENTISS
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 287 (9th ed. 1930)).
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obviously good for consumers: when a producer realizes productive efficiency
gains (as in Henry Ford's assembly line), and reduces the marginal cost of its
product (as with the Model T), those savings are passed along to consumers in
the form of lower prices.
The problem is that productive efficiency does not always coincide with
allocative efficiency. Consider the classic "naive tradeoff' hypothetical posed
nearly fifty years ago by Oliver Williamson, in which a court or regulator
evaluates the legality of a horizontal merger between firms that creates
productive efficiencies (reducing the cost of production), but gives the
newly enlarged firm a sufficient command of the market to reduce output and
raise prices for consumers, creating allocative inefficiency.'s This scenario is
depicted in Figure 3.
Figure 3.






i8. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM.
EcoN. REV. 18, 21-23 (1968).
186. This graph is taken from Williamson. Id. at 21 fig.1.
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Williamson and other proponents of a "total-welfare" theory of antitrust
law asked courts and federal regulators to weigh the relative size of A,
(deadweight loss) and A2 (productive efficiencies) to determine whether the
merger is illegal. According to Williamson, if the productive efficiencies
outweighed the deadweight loss, regulators and courts should allow the firm to
make an efficiency defense and avoid antitrust liability.' Total-welfare theory
reasons that this outcome maximizes social welfare: after all, those cost savings
from productive efficiencies go somewhere (specifically, to firms and their
shareholders) and free up resources for the production of other goods,
enriching consumers overall.' Under the total-welfare approach, regulators
prioritize the wealth of all consumers, rather than that of consumers in a
particular market ("consumer welfare" or "purchaser welfare"). 8 ,
As a policy option, the total-welfare model has much to recommend it. But
it is inconsistent with the consumer-welfare policy adopted by the states and
Congress between 1888 and 1890. As we saw in Part II, most state antitrust
statutes narrowly condemned output restrictions on particular commodities or
articles of commerce; they were not written to maximize overall social
output. 9o Under the original consumer-welfare standard, a court will not
attempt to balance productive and allocative efficiencies: the demonstrated
creation of an allocative inefficiency (deadweight loss) in a given market
suffices to prohibit the combination.
The Supreme Court has not grappled with the total welfare theory since it
explicitly adopted a consumer-welfare policy in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,'9' and
federal courts have resisted the "naive tradeoff" offered by Williamson and
other advocates of the total-welfare approach. Instead, courts have maintained
consumer welfare (allocative efficiency) as the ultimate criterion of the antitrust
laws. As Robert Pitofsky notes, "There is no recorded instance in the United
States where an otherwise illegal merger was found by a court not to violate the
187. Id. at 25, 34. Williamson's proposal has attracted adherents outside the academy. Canadian
antitrust law, for instance, recognizes a productive-efficiency defense. See Michael J.
Trebilcock & Edward M. lacobucci, National Treatment and Extraterritoriality: Defining the
Domains of Trade and Antitrust Policy, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST
JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 152, 167 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve
eds., 2004).
188. See Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act:
How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 659, 668-69 (2010).
189. Id.
190. See supra Section II.B.
191. 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
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antitrust laws because of the presence of [productive] efficiencies.""' A
representative example can be found in Judge Collyer's opinion in Federal
Trade Commission v. CCC Holdings, Inc.1' In that case, the trial court held that
it would allow the introduction of productive efficiencies as a defense to
liability only if there was concrete evidence that the benefits of such efficiencies
would be passed on to consumers in the relevant market-that is, only if
consumer welfare remained unharmed.' The federal courts' current approach
to productive efficiencies presents a straightforward implementation of the
original consumer-welfare policy.
B. Protecting Competition on Behalfof Consumers Alone
Notwithstanding federal courts' steady application of a consumer-welfare
policy, there remains a persistent call among antitrust scholars for its
abandonment in favor of a broad procompetition policy said to be rooted in the
original public understanding of the Sherman Act.9' Orbach, for instance,
argues that antitrust law should be "nuanced, dynamic, and imperfect" and
urges that Judge Hand's approach be "reheard" so as to "preserve some degree
of flexibility" in condemning business arrangements that harm competition,
broadly defined.19 6 John Kirkwood advances a similar but narrower argument
that antitrust ought to prohibit anticompetitive transfers of wealth, whether
caused by buyers or sellers.' 97
192. Robert Pitofsky, Efficiency Consideration and Merger Enforcement: Comparison of U.S. and EU
Approaches, 3o FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1413, 1418 (20o6). Although the consideration of
productive efficiencies has gained increasing acceptance among antitrust regulators at the
Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission, see William J. Kolasky & Andrew R.
Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of
Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 213-31 (2003), productive efficiencies weigh in
favor of a merger only where the cost savings are likely to be passed on to consumers in the
relevant market, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 31 (2010).
193. 605 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2oo9).
194. Id. at 74; accord Fed. Trade Comm'n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3 d 708, 720-21 (D.C. Cir.
2001); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F. 3d 1045, 1055 (8th Cir. 1999)
(approving productive efficiencies where "evidence shows that the merged entity may well
enhance competition"); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1223 (iith
Cir. 1991); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 171-72 (D.D.C.
2000).
19s. See, e.g., Orbach, supra note 23.
196. Id. at 2276.
197. John B. Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from
Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2429 (2013) ("In a buy-side case, when
suppliers are the victims of anticompetitive conduct, the overarching goal is analogous: to
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The conflict between the pro-"competition" standard and the consumer-
welfare standard arises neatly in the current debate over antitrust's treatment of
monopsonies, in which a single purchaser (or a group of purchasers) uses its
market power to reduce the price paid to suppliers of a particular good.
Kirkwood and Robert Lande argue that the antitrust laws should prohibit such
"anticompetitive behavior by buyers."'9' The argument against monopsony
was raised by some commentators in the lead-up to a failed merger attempt
between Comcast and Time Warner Cable. Critics of the deal argued that even
if the merger would not have disadvantaged consumers, it would have harmed
the providers of television content (such as HBO or Disney) by giving an
enlarged Comcast yet more leverage to negotiate low wholesale rates for
programming. As one journalist wrote, "It would be hard to successfully make
the case that their market power as sellers is pitted against consumers. Instead,
the antitrust scrutiny at the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission
will likely center on . . . monopsony."' 99 The merger was eventually scuttled
under pressure from the Federal Communications Commission, which appears
to have been principally concerned with a monopsony problem: that the new
entity's command of the broadband internet service market would allow it to
squeeze streaming content providers, like Netflix.o
Yet under the original consumer-welfare standard discussed above,
monopsony does not violate the antitrust laws unless evidence shows that
monopsony inevitably leads to reduced output and higher prices for
consumers." Just as productive efficiencies are ultimately irrelevant to
antitrust liability unless they help to preserve consumer surplus, monopsonies
are irrelevant to the enforcement of the antitrust laws unless they ultimately
diminish consumer surplus. Put differently, the consumer-welfare standard is
stop conduct that creates market power on the buying side, transfers wealth from suppliers
to buyers, and does not provide suppliers with offsetting benefits.").
198. John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting
Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 209 (20o8).
19g. Jill Priluck, The Antitrust Case Against Comcast-Time Warner, REUTERs (Feb. 20 2014),
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2oi4/o2/19/the-anti-trust-case-against-comcast-time
-warner [http://perma.cc/KR8B-QPLM].
200. See Shalini Ramachandran, Comcast Kills Time Warner Cable Deal, WAIL ST. J. (Apr.
24, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/comcast-kills-time-warner-cable-deal-1 429 878881
[http://perma.cc/4GPT-YFKQJ ("The agencies' biggest concerns came down to how they
could protect the nascent streaming TV industry against the broadband colossus the deal
would create, people familiar with the meetings between Comcast and the regulators said.").
201. Antitrust scholars on different sides of the monopsony issue agree that monopsony
sometimes affects output or consumer price but does not necessarily hurt consumers. See
Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 CORNEIL L. REV.
297, 339 (1991); Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Overbuying by Power Buyers, 72 ANTITRUST
L.J. 669, 671 (2005).
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indifferent to the balance of interests between the likes of Comcast and Netflix
unless that balance somehow diminishes the wealth of consumers."
C. Narrowing the Applicability ofPer Se Rules Under Section 1
The original consumer-welfare policy prohibited only those arrangements
entered into with the "purpose" or "intent" of raising consumer prices and
restricting output." This mens rea requirement is consistent with the
Supreme Court's conclusion in United States Gypsum Co. that intent to
manipulate prices is an element that must be proved in every Sherman Act
criminal prosecution." It also lends support to the argument that section 1 of
the Sherman Act should not impose civil liability for per se prohibitions on
business practices that do not necessarily harm consumer welfare, consistent
with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence over the past four decades.0 As the
courts have recognized, some of these practices, formerly illegal per se, are
entered into "not out of disinterested malice, but in . . . commercial self-
interest" that is essentially procompetitive.o 6 The states' mens rea requirement
suggests that per se illegality under section 1 should be reserved for cartel-like
agreements that are explicitly designed to restrict output or raise market
prices -those agreements that are actually "formed for the purpose and with the
effect" of hurting consumers."0 All other forms of agreement must be
submitted to an analysis that takes intent into account, "not because a good
intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but
because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences. ,,2
202. Cf MONT. CONST. art. XV, 5 2o (1889) ("No incorporation ... shall directly, or indirectly,
combine or form what is known as a trust . . . for the purpose of fixing the price, or
regulating the production of any article of commerce . .. for consumption by the people.");
Act of Mar. 7, 1889, ch. 266, § 1, 1889 Me. Laws 235, 235 ("It shall be unlawful for any firm.
. . organized for the purpose of manufacturing . .. any article or product which enters into
general use and consumption by the people, to form or organize any trust.").
203. See supra Part II.C.
204. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1978).
205. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (holding
that vertical price restraints are subject to a rule-of-reason standard); State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3 (1997) (applying the rule of reason to vertical maximum price fixing); Cont'l
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (applying the rule of reason to location-
of-sale restrictions).
206. Khan, 522 U.S. at 16 (quoting Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1362 (7th Cir. 1996)).
207. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (emphasis added).
208. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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CONCLUSION
The Sherman Act's capacious language helps explain the pinball-like
trajectory of American antitrust law over its long life, a life that has seen
various governing principles come and go like so many changes in political
fashion."'9 For close to forty years, however, federal courts have increasingly
embraced a single principle-consumer welfare-as antitrust's guiding policy.
This approach has brought coherence to the law, albeit dogged by lingering
doubts about its pedigree: many continue to suspect that the consumer-welfare
principle is just an expedient of the Chicago school of economics, a convenient
way of rationalizing an otherwise opaque text.
Discerning the organizing policy of the Sherman Act would be much easier,
of course, if Congress had laid out a more specific standard for liability in the
text of the Sherman Act itself. But its failure to do so does not render the
statute incomprehensible. If Congress meant anything by the Sherman Act, it
meant to supplement the states' early antitrust efforts-through case law and
through legislation -with a federal statute that would impose antitrust liability
at the interstate level to the same extent as state law did at the intrastate level.
Congress may have punted in defining antitrust liability, but the states did not.
Courts and scholars need not apologize for grafting a consumer-welfare policy
onto the Sherman Act. Consumer welfare has been there since the beginning.
1114
209. See generally Sandeep Vaheesan, The Evolving Populisns of Antitrust, 93 NEB. L. REV. 370
(2014).
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